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An EU-China Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter FTA) and Bilateral
Investment Treaty (hereinafter BIT) can stimulate new labor protections
and collective labor union cooperation in Chinese and European Union
(hereinafter EU) workplaces, benefitting individual workers. Not only will
it bring possible substantive improvements provided by the sustainability
provisions calling for compliance with I.L.O. labor standards, but most
importantly, the interface of EU trade unions with Chinese workers,
employers, and the local All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(hereinafter A.C.F.T.U.), brought about by its accompanying labor
cooperation provisions and activities, will enhance workers’ rights.1 It
will also provide a measure of certainty with rules to guide the evolving
Belt and Road Initiative (hereinafter B.R.I.) across the New Silk Road.
For example, the 2013 Switzerland-China FTA has minimal
protection of labour standards, but it includes a Memorandum of
Understanding on Labor (hereinafter M.O.U.) that commits to I.L.O. core
labor obligations and also states cooperative activities may, inter alia,
take place through dialogue, joint studies, and capacity building.2 Swiss
trade unions initially resisted the FTA but came to support it when it
determined the official linkages under the agreement to facilitate
cooperation between unions in Switzerland and China. It also have the
opportunity to educate the companies and workers regarding labor
† Professor of Law, University of Hawaii Law School, Honolulu, Hawaii (US),
ronaldc@hawaii.edu.
1 See Ronald C. Brown, Asian and US Perspectives on Labor Rights Under International
Trade Agreements Compared, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF LABOR RIGHTS: ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICY INITIATIVES 83, 96-112 (Axel
Marx et al. eds., 2015).
2 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY COOPERATION, AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. FTA, China-Chile, art.
108, Nov. 18, 2005.
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standards.3 Likewise, EU FTAs incorporate not only state commitments to
I.L.O. labor standards, but also to modes of labor cooperation.
Labor cooperation and involvement arises from trade-related
activities and from Foreign Direct Investment (hereinafter FDI) in China
or in the EU. A current example of German trade union involvement is
with the Midea Group, a Chinese electrical appliance manufacturer, that
purchased Kuka, a German manufacturer of industrial robots and
solutions for factory automation.4 Within this arrangement, the IGMetall
Trade Union through its Works Council,5 in tandem with other
stakeholders in China, promote worker benefits and protections for the
Chinese workers. It is reported that this engagement and labor
cooperation of IG Metall Trade Union with China and the A.C.F.T.U. has
been going on for some years.6 This is a cutting edge need in China’s
manufacturing industry (and other targeted industries) as China
promotes its Made in China 2025 Initiative, noted as “robot replaces
man”. This initiative has resulted large numbers of displaced workers and
the need for appropriate consideration of those workers, as well as the
retained, retrained, and the newly-hired workers.7 In this case, the
experience and the expertise of the German trade union and its
3 See Vasco Pedrina and Zoltan Doka, Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement and
Labour Rights, GLOBAL LABOUR COLUMN (Oct., 2014), http://column.global-labour-
university.org/2014/10/switzerland-china-free-trade-agreement.html.
4 See Jens Kastner, Layoffs cloud outlook for Chinese takeovers in Germany, NIKKEI ASIAN
REVIEW (Jan. 30, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Asia300/Layoffs-cloud-outlook-for-
Chinese-takeovers-in-Germany (“Kuka was acquired by Chinese appliance-maker
Midea Group, theworld’s largestmaker of home appliances, for approximately 4.6 billion
euros in December 2016. In 2016, those acquisitions totaled nearly 13 billion euros, or
5% of all industrial investment in Germany”). Kuka has also set up operations in China
and there is concern by the IGMetal Workers Union that many of the German jobs will be
moved to China. The Union protested recent layoffs at Kuka and Ledvance plants.
5 L. Fulton, Worker representation in Europe. Labor Research Department,
WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU (2015) https://www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Countries/Germany/Workplace-Representation (“Works councils
provide representation for employees at the workplace and they have substantial powers
– extending to an effective right of veto on some issues. Although not formally union
bodies, unionmembers normally play a key role within them”).
6 See Anne Sander, German Trade Unions and China: From Non-Interference to
Cooperation?, EU-CHINA CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM (July 20, 2009) https://www.eu-
china.net/uploads/tx_news/28_German_Trade_Unions_and_China_01.pdf.
7 See Ronald C. Brown,Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Digitalization on
MNC Labor Supply Chains and Workers’ Labor Rights in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 186
(2017).
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cooperation with the other stakeholders directly provides individual
workers’ benefits and protections that would not have otherwise been
achieved.
Another legal approach to bring labor cooperation is through
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) which are often absorbed into the
FTAs. While typically they do not themselves contain labor provisions,
the proposed EU-China BIT is reported to contain labor provisions.8
In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the EU and China to
“actively explore” a bilateral FTA.9 The EU-China connection is one of the
key corridors of China’s B.R.I..10 There are many reasons and
opportunities why China and the EU should contemplate a EU-China
FTA.11 Current trade is $1.5 billion per day, and against a background in
which the United States is increasingly drawing into question its
commitment to free trade and the global commons. Furthermore, with
the uncertainty resulting from Brexit, there clearly exists a need for China
and the EU not only to increase the breadth and depth of their
8 See generally EU and China Agree on Scope of the Future Investment Deal, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435 (last updated Jan.
15, 2016). (In 2016, the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an
ambitious and comprehensive scope of the upcoming EU-China investment agreement
and moved into a phase of specific text-based negotiations. The EU and China agreed
in particular that the future deal should improve market access opportunities for their
investors by establishing a genuine right to invest and by guaranteeing that they will not
discriminate against their respective companies. The EU and China are also determined
to address key challenges of the regulatory environment, including those related to
transparency, licensing and authorization procedures, and to provide for a high and
balanced level of protection for investors and their investments. The agreement will also
include rules on environmental and labor-related dimensions of foreign investment).
9 China, EU Pledge to Consider Bilateral Trade Pact, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/china-eu-pledge-to-consider-bilateral-trade-pact. (“The EU
and China agreed on Monday to consider the possibility of a bilateral trade pact, should
their current negotiations for an investment deal prove fruitful. The announcement came
as part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit to Brussels, which also saw
the EU publicly support Beijing’s bid for joining talks on a plurilateral deal in services
trade”).
10 See THE STATE COUNCIL, Full text: Action plan on the Belt and road Initiative, ENGLISH.GOV.CN,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm
(last updated Mar. 30, 2015), (China’s State Council labels its “Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiatives” as B.R.I.).
11 See Alicia García-Herrero et al., EU–China Economic Relations to
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cooperation, but also to act more strategically in the way they relate to
each other.12 Likewise, there is expanding FDI flowing both ways between
EU and China,13 with the promise of the new BIT increasing that flow.
Perhaps it is time for the EU and Chinese leaders to build on the
existing EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, to quickly
conclude on-going negotiations on their EU-China BIT, and to embrace
substantive negotiations on an EU-China FTA? China is now the EU’s
second-biggest trading partner behind the United States and the EU is
China’s biggest trading partner. The resulting BIT and FTA could enhance
trade and investment opportunities, as well as contribute to employment
opportunities and rising labor standards, bringing with it increased labor
cooperation and worker protections. There are recent precedents,
discussed herein, indicating China is open to more substantive and
cooperative labor provisions in their FTAs and BITs.
This paper focuses on enhanced labor protections and collective
labor cooperation under China and EU Members’ existing and proposed
FTAs and BITs. Following the Introduction, Part II discusses the economic
connections of trade and Foreign Direct Investment (hereinafter FDI)
between EU and China and the pathways to further the relationship. Part
III provides a legal comparison of their different approaches on labor
protections, dispute resolution, and labor cooperation in FTAs and BITs.
Part IV provides an analysis on the current and varying approaches of
enhanced labor cooperation. Part V states the conclusion and suggests
that the EU-China corridor of the new Silk Road could and should be
paved with labor protections consistent with international labor
standards and emanating from a EU-China FTA, with its accompanying
labor cooperation activities that exist within and behind the legal terms.
12 See Study on a New Era in EU-China Relations: More Wide Ranging Strategic
Cooperation?, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 570.493) 12 (2018). See also Ronald C. Brown, A New
Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements? Chinese Style Global Trade: New Rules, No Labor
Protections, 35 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1 (2017).
13 García-Herrero et al., supra note 11. (“In 2015, the stock of EU FDI inmainland China (not
including Hong Kong) amounted to e168 billion, and investment stock from mainland
China in the EU was only e35 billion (e115 billion including Hong Kong), even though
Chinese investment flows into the EU have grown substantially in recent years”).
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2. PATHWAYS TO EU-CHINA FTA, BIT, LABOR COOPERATION, AND INCREASED
LABOR PROTECTIONS
2.1. TRADE AND FDI
China is striving to become a leader in globalism14 and is investing heavily
in making it happen. One of the world’s largest projects, the B.R.I.15 is a
primary driver of China’s development strategy. A key aim of the B.R.I. is
to promote economic connectivity among countries in Eurasia by
recreating the historic Silk Road by a land and a sea route along several
corridors. A growing number of FTAs, such as Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement, are already establishing new trading
areas and, the fact EU and China each have FTAs with some of the same
countries – e.g., South Korea; suggests that China should act promptly to
set their rules of trade.16 Further pressures may come from the
soon-to-be-completed US-Mexico-Canada FTA.17 China is now the EU’s
14 See Brown, supra note 12.
15 SeeTHESTATECOUNCIL, supranote 10. (China’s StateCouncil labels its“SilkRoadEconomic
Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiatives” as B.R.I., which is explained as
follows:
The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia, Europe and
Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and
developed European economic circle at the other, and encompassing
countries with huge potential for economic development. The Silk
Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia,
Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf
and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and
connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian
Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from
China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian
Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China
Sea to the South Pacific in the other.
See also H.E. Xi Jinping, Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s
Republic of China, At the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation, XINHUANET (May 14, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
05/14/c_136282982.htm.
16 See, supra note 12.
17 Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and
Canada, Nov. 30, 2018. The three partners hope to sign and ratify it in 2019. The
agreement also requires the three nations to give three-months’ notice if they start
trade negotiations with a non-market economy (Art. 32.10), an indirect reference to
China. The US can terminate its pact with Mexico or Canada if either of them strikes
a deal with a non-market economy. See also Geoffrey Gertz, 5 things to know about
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second-biggest trading partner behind the United States and the EU is
China’s biggest trading partner. The resulting BIT and FTA could enhance
trade and FDI opportunities and contribute to China’s employment
opportunities and rising labor standards.
Trade
In 2017, the EU continues to be China’s largest trading partner
and China is the EU’s second biggest trading partner in trade in
goods, after the US. China and Europe trade goods worth well
over EUR 1.5 billion a day. Trade with China is worth a total of
EUR 375 billion in terms of EU goods imports and EUR 198
billion in terms of EU goods exports. The EU continues to
record a significant trade deficit with China, amounting to EUR
176 billion in 2017.18
Even with the growing economic integration of EU and China, with China
being EU’s biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export
market, there is still much room for growth, especially in the areas of FDI
and services.19
The European Union (EU) and China have much in common.
Their GDPs (e14.72 trillion and e9.75 trillion, respectively, in
2015) rank number two and number three in the world, behind
the United States (e16.64 trillion). They are two of the most
externally-integrated economies in the world, with annual
international trade in goods and services of e15 trillion (e5
trillion if only trade external to the EU is considered) and e4.75
trillion, respectively, in 2015. Their annual bilateral trade in
U.S.M.C.A., the new NAFTA, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/10/02/5-things-to-know-about-usmca-the-new-nafta/. See also, Trump
has cleared deck for China trade war by striking new Nafta deal, says analyst, THE STRAITS
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/trump-has-
cleared-deck-for-china-trade-war-by-striking-new-nafta-deal-say.
18 EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 570.493) 12 (2018), supra note 12.
19 See China, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china/ (last updated May 7, 2019).
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goods and services stood at e580 billion in 2015, with each
being the other’s largest source of imports and second-largest
export destination. . . . [M]any areas of economic interaction
remain under-developed, including trade in services, levels of
foreign investment, cooperation on industrial and
technological innovation, and financial market integration.20
An example of how EU-China trade often blends with FDI is illustrated
below.
Chinese firm CATL will build a battery factory in central
Germany to supply the country’s key auto industry in its
transformation toward electric cars, an investment hailed
Monday by Chancellor Angela Merkel as a “new step” in
Sino-European cooperation. . . . Industrial workers’ union IG
Metall also hailed the deal, which it said could create around
1,000 new jobs in the high-tech sector. Earlier Monday, luxury
carmaker BMW had already announced that it had struck a 4.0
billion-euro ($4.7 billion) deal to buy batteries from the
Chinese giant, with 1.5 billion euros worth of sales in Germany
and 2.5 billion in China. BMW said the Chinese battery
manufacturer would supply the cells for the electric Mini and
for BMW’s upcoming “iNext” electric limousine, slated for
production from 2021.21
20 García-Herrero et al., supranote 11, at vi. (“Chinese imports of services grew at an average
annual rate ofmore than 25 per cent between 2010 and 2015, and the EU’s trade surplus in
services with China has been growing at an average annual rate of 37 per cent since 2010,
reaching e11 billion in 2015. . . . Growing Chinese consumption, especially of services,
has the potential to create new markets for European businesses, while rising Chinese
investment in the EU, in addition to increasing EU GDP and employment, also provides
Chinese companies with a platform to improve their global competitiveness”).
21 China’s CATL to build first EU electric car battery plant in Germany, PHYS.ORG (Jul. 9, 2018),
https://phys.org/news/2018-07-china-catl-electric-car-battery.html.
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Government information on EU-China FDI shows:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe from China hit a
record 65 billion euros (USD 79 billion) in 2017, thanks largely
to ChemChina’s takeover of agribusiness company Syngenta
for USD 43 billion in Switzerland in May 2017. Without that
deal, Chinese FDI into Europe would have fallen by 22 %, to
around USD 38 billion, according to Chinese authorities.23
Chinese outbound FDI has dramatically swung toward Europe in the first
half of 2018; in the first six months of the year, newly-announced Chinese
mergers and acquisitions (hereinafter M&A) into Europe were $20 billion,
with completed investments at $12 billion.24
Sweden was the top European destination for Chinese
investment in the first half of 2018 with $3.6 billion, followed
by the U.K. at $1.6 billion, Germany at $1.5 billion and France at
$1.4 billion. Automotive, health and biotech, and consumer
22 See THE LEVIN INSTITUTE - THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK,What Are the Different Kinds
of Foreign Investment?, GLOBALIZATION 101 (2017), http://www.globalization101.org/what-
are-the-different-kinds-of-foreign-investment/. (“Foreign direct investment (FDI)
pertains to international investment in which the investor obtains a lasting interest in
an enterprise in another country. Most concretely, it may take the form of buying or
constructing a factory in a foreign country or adding improvements to such a facility, in
the form of property, plants, or equipment. FDI is calculated to include all kinds of capital
contributions, such as the purchases of stocks, as well as the reinvestment of earnings
by a wholly owned company incorporated abroad (subsidiary), and the lending of funds
to a foreign subsidiary or branch. The reinvestment of earnings and transfer of assets
between a parent company and its subsidiary often constitutes a significant part of FDI
calculations”).
23 EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 570.493) 12 (2018), supra note 12, at 14 (“Annual Chinese outbound
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 28 EU economies has grown from EUR 700
million in 2008 to EUR 35 billion in 2017; whereas, EU investment in China is about
EUR 10 billion annually”). See also Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Huotari, EU-China
FDI: Working towards reciprocity in investment relations, MERICS PAPERS ON CHINA (May,
2018), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/180723.pdf (“According to
Chinese authorities, in 2017 the main destinations for China’s merchandise exports
remained the United States 19%; the EU 16%”). See also UNCTAD, World Investment
Report 2018, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/.pdf. See also EUROPEAN
THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-level Approach,
MERCATOR INSTITUTE FOR CHINA STUDIES (Dec., 2017), https://www.merics.org/en/about-
us/programs/ecpu/etnc/chinese-investment-in-europe (“Chinese global FDI in 2016
was at the top at $893 billion versus the U.S. in third place at $595 billion”).
24 SeeNatashaTurak,China is investing9 timesmore intoEurope than intoNorthAmerica, CNBC
(July 17, 2018).
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products and services have become the top recipients for
Chinese FDI in both the U.S. and Europe.25
Because of a gap in investment openness between EU and China, concerns
have been raised about detrimental economic impacts such as unfair
competition and resulting market distortions and a sense among EU
citizens and businesses that the playing field between Europe and China is
not level.26 This strengthens protectionist sentiment and fuels political
backlash against economic engagement with China. Thus, the resolution
of reciprocity concerns is critical for future EU-China economic relations
and is, of course part of the discussion in the EU-China BIT
negotiations.27
FDI brings about increased employment and thus possible labor
impacts. In 2018 BMW in Germany reported that Chinese firm CATL will
build a battery factory in Germany to supply it’s auto industry’s
transformation to electric cars. German “industrial workers’ union IG
Metall” also hailed the deal, which it said could create around 1,000 new
jobs in the high-tech sector.28 Additionally, it is reported that “global
25 Id.
26 See Till Hoppe and Stephan Scheuer, Stopping the Chinese, HANDELSBLATT TODAY (June 19,
2017) https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies/stopping-the-chinese-783166 (“The
European Union is drawing up proposals [draft EU law] that will allow it to monitor and
possibly block the takeover of European companies by state-owned Chinese businesses,
but German car makers fear the law could hit their Chinese markets”). See also
Norbert Häring et al., Warnings Over State Intervention in Kuka Deal, HANDELSBLATT TODAY
(June 3, 2016), https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/companies/chinese-investment-
warnings-over-state-intervention-in-kuka-deal/23538330.html.
27 HANEMANN & HUOTARI, supra note 23, at 3-8. (“Chinese investments in Europe, especially
in Germany, reveal a strong move toward market and asset-seeking investments.
German companies acquired by Chinese investors, especially in the machinery industry,
are often not only leaders in their fields, but also strongly focused on RD. This
Investment Motive seems to be the predominant MA strategy of Chinese companies
in Germany”). See also Dr. Margot Schüller, Globalisation of Chinese Companies,
GIGA (2013), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/projekt/globalization-of-chinese-
companies. See also FRANKFURT BUREAU, Factbox: Chinese investments in German
companies, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-daimler-
geely-factbox/factbox-chinese-investments-in-german-companies-idUSKCN1GA1RO
(for a partial list of Chinese companies FDI in Germany). See also Miriam Widman,
Chinese Takeovers of German Firms on the Rise, HANDELSBLATT TODAY (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies/chinese-takeovers-of-german-firms-on-
the-rise-12623. See also New Chinese battery factory electrifies German e-car revolution,
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automakers are planning a $300 billion surge in spending on electric
vehicle technology over the next five to ten years, with nearly half of the
money targeted at China, accelerating the industry’s transition from
fossil fuels and shifting power to Asian battery and electric vehicle
technology suppliers.”29
FDI and BITs
“While the early literaturewas skeptical on the effectiveness of BITs,more
recent empirical studies generally find that BITs do actually stimulate the
inflow of FDI.”30
We find strong evidence that liberal admission rules promote
bilateral FDI. We focus on two investment provisions which
constitute important legal innovations relating to the
liberalization and protection of FDI: (i) guarantees of market
access for foreign investors bymeans of NT andMFN treatment
in the pre-establishment phase; and (ii) credible commitments
against discriminatory and discretionary treatment by means
of ISDSmechanisms in the post-establishment phase.31
With increasing FDI, more foreign companies will be establishing
business in the foreign location which will employ workers who may be
represented by labor unions, thus raising the question of the role of labor
union cooperation with the foreign employer.32 Unions in Switzerland are
29 This is an unprecedented level of spending – fueled by Germany’s Volkswagen AG. It is
reported, “the future of Volkswagen will be decided in the Chinese market,” said Herbert
Diess, chief executive of VW. Paul Lienert et al., Exclusive: VW, China spearhead $300 billion
global drive to electrify cars, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
autoshow-detroit-electric-exclusive/exclusive-vw-china-spearhead-300-billion-
global-drive-to-electrify-cars-idUSKCN1P40G6?utm_source=applenews.
30 Liesbeth Colen and Andrea Guariso, What Type of FDI Is Attracted by Bilateral Investment
Treaties?, LICOS CENTRE FOR INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (June 12, 2012),
https://www.etsg.org/ETSG2012/Programme/Papers/197.pdf.
31 Axel Berger,Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp andMartin Roy, Do Trade and Investment
Agreements Lead to More FDI? Accounting for Key Provisions Inside the Black Box, KIEL
WORKING PAPERS IFW (2010), https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wtowps/ersd201013.html.
32 See Tian Ameng,FTA a win-win for China and Switzerland, CHINADAILY (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017wef/2017-01/19/content_27996541.htm.
In 2017, China and Switzerland upgraded their 2013 FTA and data showed that: “in
2015, Sino-Swiss bilateral trade reached $44.27 billion, of which China’s imports from
Switzerland amounted to $41.1 billion. There are currently around 100 Chinese companies
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reported to have agreed in 2013 to the Switzerland-China FTA (which
incorporated BIT provisions),33 notwithstanding concerns over
protection of labor rights based on their conviction that: “first, a policy of
economic opening towards China is better than one of isolating that
country, . . . secondly, the durability provisions that were negotiated . . .
provide better means of pressing both countries to combat human and
labor rights breaches than would have been the case without such an
FTA”.34
2.2. PATHWAYS TO EU-CHINA BIT AND FTA
The pathway to an eventual successful bilateral FTA would be to build on
the existing EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that places
an EU-China BIT35 as central to the EU’s long-term bilateral relations
in Switzerland. There’s also a growing interest from Chinese investor for Swiss brands in
terms of M&A, targeting commodities but also sports, media and technologies, such as
the deals between ChemChina and Syngenta, between DalianWanda and Infront Sports &
Media”.
33 See FTA, Switz.-China, Chapter 8, July 5, 2013 (includes all aspects of a BIT for
investment).
34 PEDRINA & DOKA, supra note 3. Switzerland-China FTA, Art. 3: 1. The Parties
reaffirm the importance of cooperation to further improve their respective labour
standards and practices in line with their national labour policy objectives and according
to the obligations set out in applicable I.L.O. Conventions. 2. In pursuit of this
objective, theParties agree that cooperation relating to labour andemployment, including
administrative and technical cooperation as well as capacity building, shall be conducted
under the bilateral M.O.U..
35 See Axel Berger, Investment Treaties and the Search for Market Access in China,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (June 26, 2013),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/06/26/investment-treaties-and-the-search-for-
market-access-in-china/ (EU-China BIT has also been referred to as the Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment (CAI) and the terms appear to have flexibility as the
latter may omit some terms present in a BIT). See also Iuliu Winkler, EU-China
Investment Agreement - Legislative Train Schedule, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (May 20, 2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-
trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-china-investment-agreement. For
example, China also negotiates Preferential Trade Investment Agreements (hereinafter
P.T.I.A.) of which four include comprehensive rules on investment:
These treaties where negotiated with Pakistan (2006), New Zealand
(2008), Peru (2009) and ASEAN (2009). The P.T.I.A. with Singapore
just incorporates the China-ASEAN investment agreement and the
P.T.I.A. with Costa Rica from 2010 just reaffirms the China-Costa Rica
BIT signed in 2007. The P.T.I.A. recently signed with Iceland follows
this approachand“recognizes the importance” (Art. 92) of theChina-
Iceland BIT from 1994.
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with China.36 The BIT would accelerate the process toward an FTA and
create a more open and transparent environment for increased flows of
investment. It would also improve investment for European and Chinese
investors by creating investment rights and guaranteeing
non-discrimination, improving transparency, and providing investment
rules on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign investment,
as all are potential obstacles for agreement on an FTA.37
In2014, China, supportedby theEU, joined theUS-ledandon-going
negotiations under theWTO towards a global Trade in Services Agreement
that also seeks to openmarkets and improve rules.38
Furthermore, there is a Working Group from high levels of EU and
Chinese governments, underscoring the seriousness of the work; the
EU-China Trade Project II (hereinafter E.U.C.T.P.), works on the many
substantive issues underlying an EU-China FTA and suggests appropriate
positions and accommodations to support China’s continued integration
into the global trading system.39




38 See Trade in Services Agreement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
in-focus/tisa/ (last updated July 14, 2017). See also Shawn Donnan and
Andrew Byrne, China Courts EU on Bilateral Trade Agreement, FINANCIAL TIMES
https://www.ft.com/content/77dc2efc-b9b4-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0.
39 See Project Background, E.U.C.T.P., http://www.euctp.org/index.php/en/project-
background.html.(“The E.U.C.T.P. works with Chinese and European ministries,
directorates general and other organizations to develop and deliver results, as well
as other international and donor organizations working in the field of trade and
sustainable development in China. China partners include: Ministry of Commerce,
National Development and Reform Commission, State Administration of Industry and
Commerce, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Housing and Urban-rural Development,
Ministry of Agriculture, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine (AQSIQ), Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, The People’s Bank of
China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission,
China Insurance Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange,
Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing
Municipal Commission of Commerce, Beijing WTO Affairs Center, China Science and
Technology Exchange Center EU Partners: Directorate Generals for Trade, Directorate
General for Health and Consumers, Directorate General for the Internal Market,
Directorate General for Agriculture, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs
Union, Directorate General for Information Society and Media, Directorate General
for Mobility and Transport, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
Directorate General for Climate Action, Directorate General for Energy, Directorate
General for Enterprise and Industry, Directorate General for Competition, and, EU
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Further opportunities to move discussions on the EU-China BIT toward
completion will arise in the second half of 2020 when the EU and China
appear to be having a summit meeting. 40
3. EU AND CHINA LABOR PROTECTIONS IN BITS AND FTAS
3.1. BITS
The EU Members have a number of BITs,41 most of which do not include
labor provisions. However, three Member States have entered into four
BITs that include labor provisions, including Belgium-Luxembourg42 and
Austria, 43 that entered three separate BITs and commit to the I.L.O. core
labor standards. Currently, though there are China BITs with EU
Delegation to China and Mongolia, EU China Project on the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR2), European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC)”).
40 See Andreas Rinke, Merkel planning EU-China summit for Germany’s 2020
presidency, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-china-
germany/merkel-planning-eu-china-summit-for-germanys-2020-presidency-
sources-idUKKCN1P81FC. (“Chancellor Angela Merkel has proposed a China-European
Union summit during Germany’s 2020 EU presidency that would include national leaders
of EU countries as well as officials from Brussels and Beijing, EU diplomats said. The
summit, which is likely to coincide with China’s displacement of the United States
as the EU’s largest trade partner, would aim to counter what Berlin sees as Beijing’s
divide-and-rule approach to dealing with the bloc. Projects like the Belt-and-Road
debt-for-development initiative has made China an influential player in poorer eastern
EUmembers like Hungary and Greece”).
41 See How to Understand the China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiation, INSTITUTE
OF EUROPEAN STUDIES OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, (May 13, 2019),
http://ies.cass.cn/english/chinare/cer/201309/t20130903_2464193.shtml. It has been
noted that the BITs of EUmembers “are still incomplete as there is a lack of completeness
and coordination from the overall perspective of the EU. Moreover, the BITs concluded
by China with different EU Member States, although quite similar, may result in large
differences in specific content such as standards of treatment, currency exchange
and different provisions with regard to dispute settlement.” See also Jie Hao and
Dawe Li, Progress, Difficulties and Promotion Strategies of the EU-China BIT Negotiation,
http://english.cciee.org.cn/archiver/ccieeen/UpFile/Files/Default/2017121.pdf. See
also International Investment Agreements Navigator, UN INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent. (“International
investment agreements (IIAs) are divided into two types: (1) bilateral investment
treaties and (2) treaties with investment provisions”).
42 See Agreement for Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, BLEU -
Montenegro, art. 1(6), Apr. 22, 2016.
43 See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Austria - Taj., art. 5, Dec.
15, 2010.
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members, none include labor provisions. As EU and China trade continues
to grow, it is also expected that FDI will increase in both countries. This
will result in more interaction with workers and foreign labor unions and
increases the need for attention to labor issues and labor union
cooperation.44 Meanwhile, the negotiations for an EU-China BIT
continue.45 “It will replace the 26 existing Bilateral Investment Treaties
between 27 individual EU Member States and China by one single
comprehensive investment Agreement.”46
The EU Government stated: “The EU’s top priorities remain the
conclusion of the Comprehensive EU-China Agreement on Investment
[BIT].”47 Further, German Chancellor Merkel said she “wanted quick
progress on an EU-China investment deal and that this would be a
precondition to any free trade talks, a move Premier Li said would be
timely.”48
44 See John Seaman, Mikko Huotari, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, (eds.),, Chinese Investment in
Europe: A Country-Level Approach, EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, p. 154-155
(Dec. 2017), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/171216_ETNC%20Repo
rt%202017_0.pdf.
45 See Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (The 18th
round of negotiations took place in Brussels from 12 to 13 July 2018). For a more
comprehensive analysis, see Ronald C. Brown, China-EU BIT and FTA: Building a Bridge
on the Silk Road Not Detoured by Labor Standard Provisions, UNIV. WASH. INT’L L. J.
(forthcoming 2019-20).
46 Id. (“In 2016 the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious
and comprehensive scope for the EU-China investment agreement and established a joint
negotiating text”).
47 EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 570.493) 12 (2018), supra note 12, at 6.
Negotiations, launched in 2013, on the EU’s first bilateral
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment are the EU’s immediate
top priority with a view to deepening and rebalancing relations with
China. The aim is to reach the same level of openness in China’s
market that is already available in the EU’s market. The objective
is to facilitate market access by addressing both discriminatory and
quantitative restrictions. Both investment and investor protection
and reciprocal market access are important aspects for the EU. The
EU Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with China
do not provide for investment market access. So far, 17 rounds of
negotiations have taken place, the most recent one from 22 to 24May
2018.
48 Germany and China Vow to Expand Partnership Amid Concerns About Trump’s Policies, BLACK
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It is perhaps noteworthy that the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for
Cooperation placed as a goal in its EU-China BIT negotiations – to
negotiate “rules on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign
investment” (emphasis added).49
Although current China BITs, included those concluded with EU
Member States do not contain labor protections or references to I.L.O.
standards,50 it is not uncommon for a BIT to precede an FTA and is often
incorporated into the FTA. It was recently51 noted that as “a precursor to
their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, which launched in March
2013, China, Japan, and Korea (CJK) signed a trilateral investment
agreement in May 2012.”52 And, as noted above, it is reported to be
included in the currently negotiated EU-China BIT.
3.2. FTAS
EU FTAs all contain labor protection provisions committing to I.L.O. core
labor standards and have a dispute resolution system with a tripartite
format, though without penalties for violations (e.g., Japan, Canada, S.
Korea). First, there are substantive standards committing to I.L.O. core
49 Trade, EUROPEAN COMMISSION http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china/ (last updated May 7, 2019). See also FRANK BICKENBACH ET
AL., KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, THE EU-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION: MOTIVATION, CONFLICTS AND PERSPECTIVE 95 (2015).
50 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 45. There are 26 existing Bilateral Investment
Treaties between 27 individual EU Member States and China. See also Investment Policy
Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.
51 See Jeffrey J. Schott and Cathleen Cimino, The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment
Agreement: Implications for US Policy and the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, PIIE
BRIEFING (Feb., 2015), https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-
bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-
treaty.pdf.
52 Agreement among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of
Korea, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion,
Facilitation and Protection of Investment, May 13, 2012. For discussion of difficulties
of negotiating a trilateral FTA, see Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Elusive China-Japan-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (Sept., 2015) (thesis, NPS Monterey, California),
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1008948.pdf (the author suggests there are “four
potential explanations for the trilateral FTA’s current lack of progress: perceptions of the
deal not being an economic priority, the power of influential domestic business interests
negatively affected by the FTA, regional competition over China’s growing domestic
market, and regional political-historical animosities”).
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labor standards and the Decent Work Agenda; second, there are
obligations and procedural commitments relating to implementation;
third, there are institutional mechanisms to resolve disputes. 53
Of China’s thirteen FTAs, five include labor protection standards
(Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and Switzerland). Of the five FTAs
that have references to labor issues, substantive provisions are not in the
texts of FTAs but are in M.O.Us. There is diversity ranging from the
China-Iceland FTA54 where the parties agree to enhanced labor
communication and cooperation, to other agreements, such as with New
Zealand and Switzerland55 where, as in EU FTAs, the parties reaffirm their
obligations under the I.L.O. and recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage trade or investment by weakening or failing to enforce labor
laws, and that it is inappropriate to set or use labor laws, regulations,
policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes, but there is no
enforcement mechanism.56
The text of the 2013 Switzerland-China FTA itself has very minimal
language regarding labor standards. Chapter 13.5, Economic and
Technical Cooperation, refers to the 2011 and the 2013 China-Swiss
M.O.U..57 This M.O.U. has language that largely parallels the language of
the EU’s FTA labor provisions. Likewise, China’s FTAs with non-EU
53 See James Harrison et al., Governing Labor Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits
of the European Union’s Trade and Sustainable Development, 57 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 260
(2018).
54 See FTA, China-Iceland, art. 96, Apr. 15, 2013.
55 See, e.g., FTA, Switz.-China, July, 2013.
56 See FTA, N.Z.-China, Apr. 7, 2008.
57 See Agreement on Labor and Employment Cooperation, Switz.-China, 2013. See also
the 2013 M.O.U. also referenced an earlier more generally-worded 2011 Memo of
Understanding.
Considering the objectives and principles of the International Labor
Organization (hereinafter I.L.O.) of which Switzerland and the
People’s Republic of China aremembers; including their commitment
under the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and its follow-up, as well as the 2008 I.L.O. Declaration on
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, Determined to improveworking
conditions and living standards in their respective countries and
protect, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights as embodied in the
core labor standards, have reached the following understanding.
See also Agreement on Labor and Employment Cooperation, Switz.-China, 2011.
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members, Chile and New Zealand have similar language in their labor
provisions committing to I.L.O. core labor standards.58
In sum, comparing past BITs of China and the EU, respectively,
neither includes labor provisions. However, three EU Members – Austria
and Belgium-Luxembourg (in tandem) have concluded BITs containing
labor provisions that are quite like those in the recent EU’s FTAs. China’s
FTA-related M.O.U.s regarding labor standards and dispute resolution are
like those of the EU.
4. LABOR COOPERATION
Labor cooperation, with or without an FTA, occurs in different forms,
formal and informal, with the former sometimes hosted by the
governments and include conducting training and workshops, frequently
in cooperation with other organizations, such as the I.L.O., O.E.C.D.,
International Trade Union Confederation (hereinafter I.T.U.C.). Informal
education of labor rights and issues is often undertaken by labor unions
themselves.
For example, in Switzerland, that has an FTA with China, the
unions are working to create labor education and cooperation between
Swiss and Chinese labor unions and workers.59 Although it remains to be
seen whether this FTA can really become a lever in the struggle for human
and labor rights in China, their strategic plan is described below.
The Swiss multisectoral trade union, Unia, together with the
development organization, Solidar Suisse, has chosen an
interesting approach, with the dual aim of both contributing to
the application of labor rights in China and promoting the
notion of solidarity among their own members and the general
public. The main element is the provision of support to
58 See FTA, China-Chile, Nov. 18, 2005. See also FTA, N.Z.-China,Apr. 7, 2008.
59 See, e.g., PEDRINA & DOKA, supra note 3.
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rank-and-file groups in China that have set out to assist
workers in their struggle to get their rights applied. Chinese
labor law does provide scope for this, but the big problem is
implementation. As part of this program, support is given to
grassroots organizations which advise and mentor workers
regarding problems with overtime, social insurance and
occupational health.
A second objective, in both countries, is to establish a link
between employee representatives within Swiss firms active in
China (whether subsidiaries or joint ventures). The aim here is
to get labor rights respected by promoting collective
agreements. In China, the conditions for this have been slightly
improved recently by the creation of a new legal basis for
collective bargaining policy. In several provinces, it is now
quite possible to conclude collective agreements. This raises
the question of the form to be given to relations with the
official trade unions affiliated to the A.C.F.T.U. federation.
These are the only organizations with a recognized entitlement
to represent employees.60
German labor cooperation provides another illustration. Inside the
workplace itself, the goals of labor education, reform, and cooperation
may be taking place, where as a result of FDI, foreign employers must deal
with the local laws and labor unions in working out understandings and
accommodations. For example, the Chinese companyMidea, that recently
purchased German robotic company Kuka in Germany, continues to have
the IG Metall Worker’s Union influencing employer labor decisions. In
November 2017, the employer announced that 250 of the unit’s 5000
employees would be cut, and immediately, the union head of the
60 Id. (“The third element is awareness-raising in Switzerland. ”My colleague Li“ is the
slogan that Unia and Solidar Suisse have chosen for regional events, a film, workplace
leafleting etc. The aim is to inform union members about the realities of labor struggles
in China today and our solidarity action, thus encouraging them to play an active part. By
denouncing abuses, the intention is also to put pressure on the Swiss authorities and on
China to start changing things. The durability provisions in the new FTA are to be used as
a lever for this”).
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Augsburg branch of IG Metall, Germany’s largest labor union said, “talks
with management are underway to ‘get to the bottom of it”.61 The
engagement of labor unions and employers in collective bargaining is an
attribute of labor cooperation and is at the core of labor cooperation to
benefit the workers.
The strategies of German unions towards China began with
research, training, and visits along with some grassroots assistance; and,
they also participate in joint programs with I.T.U.C. and other sector
international unions.62 As early as 2009 there was cooperation between
China’s A.C.F.T.U. and Germany’s IG Metall Trade Union and it has proven
to be by far the most active foreign union in China with the longest
experience in cooperation.
German unions have adopted a variety of strategies for dealing
and cooperating with the ACFTU and on a much smaller scale
also with Chinese workers. This however can be explained quite
easily, given that roughly 75% of German enterprises investing
in China fall within the scope of the IGMetall.63
The IG Metall Trade Union determined that coping with the ongoing
globalization, had to be by transnational trade union cooperation and
strived for adjustment of labor standards worldwide as an instrument to
both preserve German jobs and fight for social justice in developing
economies.64 For specific strategies, it targeted companies, not workers,
61 Daniel Ron, German robot maker Kuka eyes e1b sales in China by tapping
parent’s Midea Group’s network, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2136197/german-robot-
maker-kuka-eyes-eu1b-sales-china-tapping-parents. See also, Barbara Woolsey,
Robot maker Kuka feels the squeeze, HANDELSBLATT TODAY (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies/robot-maker-kuka-feels-the-squeeze-
861702 (Under the investor agreement spanning to 2023, Midea said it would not
interfere inmanagement or close any plants andwould support Kuka’s growth strategies.
The agreement also said it would not delist Kuka from the German stock exchange
or access Kuka’s intellectual property and client data). See also KASTNER, supra note
4. See also, Kuka Sustainability Report 2017, https://www.kuka.com/-/media/kuka-
corporate/documents/ir/reports-and-presentations/sustainability-reports/kuka-
sustainability-report-2017.pdf.
62 See SANDER, supra note 6.
63 Id.
64 See Id. (“One of the earliest attempts of enterprise-level international engagement and
cooperation wasmade by parts of the IGMetall in the auto industry. As a forum for union
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codes of conduct, and international framework agreements65and
established “trade union cooperation inMNCs and Joint Ventures through
their international partners (notably the IMF).”66
[T]he most active and successful engagement has not been
targeted at those Chinese workers most affected by appalling
working conditions (e.g. unskilled migrant laborers working in
the informal sector or the Export processing enterprises of
most notably the textile and toy industry) but rather at big
companies (Bayer, Siemens, VW or Daimler Chrysler to name
only a few) employing skilled Chinese labor. This is however
not surprising, as the main focus of national unions in the
international arena has always been on labor issues in
subsidiary companies of these big companies’ German
unions.67
At the same time, the goals of labor education, reform, and cooperation
are taking place at the workplace level, where as a result of FDI, foreign
employers must deal with the local laws and labor unions in working out
understandings and accommodations.
Sweden, an EU Member without a bilateral FTA with China, has
ongoing labor workshops with China dealing with labor themes and
Corporate Social Responsibility, including for example, training on
“social responsibility and international trade, labor contract, working
workplace representatives and shop stewards they sought to establish communication
and exchange of informationbetweenworkforces of plantsworldwide. Solidarity action is
organized if necessary, as well as qualification and training of unionists for international
trade union work”).
65 See Id.(“Daimler Chrysler has established a Code of Conduct in their Chinese production
plants, Faber Castell has implemented a Social Charta which is monitored by IG Metall
and IMF. IG Metall‘s especially tried to establish trade union structures particularly in
German-Chinese Joint Ventures. Additionally, strived to implement social minimum
standards through Codes of Conduct – as for instance for Daimler Chrysler. International
Framework Agreements have so far been the most effective means of engagement in
China”).
66 Id.
67 Id. (“An early IMF and Asia Monitor Resource Centre report in China-based plants of
GermanMNCs found thatworkerswere largelyunawareof suchagreementsand that there
were not shown to be effective. The same report also revealed that the impact of trade
unions is bigger in joint ventures where some boardmembers are German and thus closer
consultation with German unions takes place (e.g. Beijing Daimler Chrysler)”).
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hour, wage and benefit, harmonious working relationship, international
standard of working hour and wage, factory inspection as well as
requirements and management for young workers.”68 Swedish labor
union cooperation with the Chinese labor union is also ongoing.
“The Swedish model is unique because it is an agreement
between trade unions, the employers’ organizations and the
government,” said Mr. Anders Ferbe, Chairman of the Swedish
trade union IF Metall at a seminar about democratic
management in business in Beijing [in 2015]. The event offered
a unique and first-time opportunity for Swedish companies to
meet representatives from the ACTFUs.69
Likewise, China participates in ongoing labor workshops; for example, a
recent seminar co-hosted by the A.C.F.T.U. and Trade Union Advisory
Committee to the O.E.C.D. (hereinafter O.E.C.D.-T.U.A.C.) has dealt
specifically with the sustainable development of multinational
corporations and the role of trade union. The seminar dealt with “China’s
initiatives to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road, [and how] to regulate the behavior of multinational
corporations, safeguard workers’ rights and promote sustainable
growth”.70
There is also an international organization, the Trade Union
Development Cooperation Network (hereinafter T.U.D.C.N.) whose
68 Joint Activities, SINO-SWEDISH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY WEBSITE,
http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/wangzhanjianjie/about2.shtml#jinzhan28. (A list
of the many joint activities is provided).
69 See The Swedish model: a win-win-win solution to industrial relations,
SINO-SWEDISH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY WEBSITE (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/csrnews/news2015/201505/20150500959653.shtml.
For example, Swedish fashion brand H&M is helping its suppliers
in China to build a good industrial relation in the factories with the
support of IF Metall. We are working from different angles, including
internal communication, cooperation with other brands, engagement
of local governments and capacity building for the suppliers. . . . Mr.
Zhang Zhijun, Director of Supervision Division of Legal Department
of A.C.F.T.U. suggested, “It is very important for companies to build
up an internal communication mechanism between the workers and
management”.
70 A.C.F.T.U./O.E.C.D.-T.U.A.C. Seminar, ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (May 28,
2015), http://en.acftu.org/28612/201505/28/150528142253162.shtml.
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objective is to bring the trade union perspective to the international
development policy debates and improve the coordination and
effectiveness of trade union development cooperation activities.
T.U.D.C.N. is an initiative of the I.T.U.C. bringing together affiliated trade
union organizations, solidarity support organizations, regional ITUC
organizations, the Global Union Federations (GUFs), the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC) and the O.E.C.D.-T.U.A.C..71
5. CONCLUSION
An EU-China BIT and FTA with stabilizing “rules of the road” provisions
and labor provisions will increase FDI and provide more inter-union and
union-foreign employer interaction and cooperation and impetus for
increased worker protection. The EU-China corridor of the new Silk Road
could and should be paved with standards consistent with international
labor standards and emanating from an EU-China BIT and FTA and with
its accompanying labor cooperation that exists within and behind the
legal terms. This provides an additional approach to enforcement and
improvement of workers’ conditions whether it occurs accompanying the
formal levels of treaties, by the I.L.O., or by the informal changes “on the
ground”, coming from the diverse avenues of labor cooperation.
71 Seegenerally Tradeunions as actors of development educationandawareness raising for global
solidarity, TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION NETWORK (2016), https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/tudcn_brochure_dear_2016_en.pdf.
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